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FUELING CONTROVERSY
RANDY BECK

*

In a recent Yale Law Journal article, Linda Greenhouse and Reva
Siegel question the received wisdom that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Roe v. Wade generated a political backlash, inflaming conflict over
1
abortion and damaging the political process. The authors do not deny
2
that Roe has served as a lightning rod in the culture wars. The evidence
they highlight, though, shows that political conflict over abortion
predated the Roe opinion, spurred by the Catholic Church and by
3
Republican Party strategists seeking to foster party realignment. This
enriched picture of the political and social landscape at the time of the
decision undermines any simplistic suggestion that Roe served as “the
4
sole cause of backlash” or “single-handedly caused societal polarization
5
and party realignment around the question of abortion.”
At the same time, not all critiques of Roe based on its consequences
for our shared political life are grounded in a simple belief that Roe
6
“began conflict over abortion.” Greenhouse and Siegel make no
mention of perhaps the most famous articulation of the backlash thesis,
offered by Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who argued
that “[a] less encompassing Roe, one that merely struck down the
extreme Texas law and went no further on that day . . . might have
7
served to reduce rather than to fuel controversy.” Justice Ginsburg
recognized that conflict over abortion predated Roe, but saw the Court’s
* Justice Thomas O. Marshall Chair of Constitutional Law, University of Georgia
School of Law. I am grateful to Katie Croghan for helpful research assistance.
1. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions
About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2030–31 (2011).
2. Greenhouse and Siegel acknowledge that “Roe has become nearly synonymous with
political conflict,” and that “‘Roe’ is now a shorthand reference for positions staked out in
long-running debates over gender, religion, and politics.” Id. at 2030, 2033.
3. Id. at 2046–47.
4. Id. at 2081.
5. Id. at 2073.
6. Id. at 2072.
7. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199
(1992).
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8

opinion as pouring fuel on the fire. Her position seems immune to the
authors’ criticism that the backlash narrative discourages vindication of
9
rights through the courts or counsels avoidance of adjudication. Justice
Ginsburg embraced the Roe litigation and the invalidation of the Texas
statute by the Court, criticizing only the breadth of the opinion, which
constitutionalized abortion rights far broader than necessary to
10
invalidate either the Texas statute in Roe or the Georgia statute at
11
issue in the companion case of Doe v. Bolton.
As Greenhouse and Siegel emphasize, “facts matter in any
conversation about Roe as an exemplar of the possibilities and limits of
12
judicial review.” Careful evaluation of the Court’s handiwork in Roe
requires a sophisticated understanding of forces contributing to the
abortion conflict, an understanding the authors advance through their
13
research.
But such an evaluation also demands a sophisticated
understanding of the Roe decision itself. The authors tell us much about
events prior to the Court’s decision in Roe, but they say very little about
the choices the Justices made in writing the opinion, choices that
hampered any stable political resolution of the abortion issue.
Supreme Court files from Roe and Doe show that Justice Blackmun
circulated successive draft opinions staking out three distinct and
14
increasingly expansive positions on the constitutional right to abortion.
The Court ultimately gravitated to the most far-reaching of these
formulations, recognizing a right to abortion for any reason until the
15
fetus becomes viable (i.e., able to live outside the womb). This viability
rule extended constitutional abortion rights through the second
16
trimester of pregnancy, give or take a few weeks. The Court staked
8. Id. at 1208.
9. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2086.
10. Randy Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta: The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s Trimester
Framework, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 505, 507–08 (2011) (citing and quoting Ginsburg, supra
note 7, at 1199).
11. See 410 U.S. 179, 201–02 (1973).
12. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2033.
13. See id. at 2086.
14. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 550–51, 580–81, 585–86 (1994); Beck, supra note 10, at 515–26
(detailing the development of Justice Blackmun’s successive draft opinions).
15. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–65 (1973).
16. See id.; Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2031–32. At Justice Powell’s
suggestion, the Roe majority “extended constitutional protection from the first to the second
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out this sweeping constitutional entitlement even though Justices in the
majority recognized that resolution of Roe and Doe did not require an
opinion on the duration of abortion rights, an issue neither briefed nor
17
argued by the parties.
The Court’s unnecessary, unexplained, and
almost casual adoption of the viability rule created a regime of abortion
rights offering far less potential protection for fetal life than most other
18
countries of the world.
The Court’s adoption of the viability rule in Roe did not initiate
political conflict over abortion, but it did channel and exacerbate the
nascent conflict in ways that make a stable resolution difficult to attain.
By greatly restricting the range of permissible legislative action, the
viability rule disabled legislative bodies from negotiating political
compromises like those worked out in other countries. At the same
time, the decision facilitated pro-life mobilization, putting abortion
rights advocates in the position of defending methods of abortion
“susceptible to gruesome description,” as Justice Ginsburg once rather
19
delicately framed the matter. While the political system might have
adjusted to a more limited constitutional right, Roe’s extension of
abortion rights through the second trimester of pregnancy created a
structural misalignment between constitutional law and popular
sentiment, evidenced by significant majorities affirming that second
20
trimester abortions should be presumptively illegal. Absent a fairly
seismic shift in public opinion about late-term abortions—something
that has not occurred in the nearly four decades since Roe—the viability
rule made it impossible to enact abortion laws even roughly

trimester of pregnancy, until the point of fetal viability.” Greenhouse & Siegel, supra, at
2031–32.
17. Beck, supra note 10, at 511–12, 516.
18. Randy Beck, Essay, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 249,
261–65 (2009) (comparing the United States’ abortion rights regime to that of other countries
and explaining that “by allowing abortion for any reason until viability, the Court has pushed
U.S. abortion law far outside the international mainstream”).
19. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 951 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that
“the most common method of performing previability second trimester abortions [(the
D&E)] is no less distressing or susceptible to gruesome description” than the D&X method at
issue in the case). Justice Stevens provided a similar abortion-method comparison in his
concurrence, finding no reason to think D&X abortion “is more brutal, more gruesome, or
less respectful of ‘potential life’ than the equally gruesome [D&E] procedure Nebraska claims
it still allows.” See id. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring).
20. See infra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.

12-BECK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

738

3/20/2012 2:08 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[95:735

approximating the views of a majority of Americans. The result has
been an intractable battle over abortion, centered on the future of the
Court.
I.
Counsel in Roe and Doe initially argued their cases to a seven21
member Supreme Court, with two seats unfilled. The task of writing
opinions was assigned to Justice Blackmun, the Court’s newest
22
member. Justice Blackmun’s first draft of an opinion in Roe would
have invalidated the Texas statute on vagueness grounds, rather than on
23
the basis of a constitutional right to abortion. The first draft of Doe
recognized a constitutional right to abortion, but expressed no opinion
as to when in pregnancy a state would have a compelling interest in
24
regulating to protect fetal life.
Five Justices (Blackmun, Douglas,
Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart) signed onto these opinions, striking
down the Texas statute as vague and the Georgia statute as violating an
25
abortion right of unspecified duration.
Notwithstanding an
insurmountable majority in favor of a constitutional right to abortion,
however, the Court accepted Justice Blackmun’s suggestion to rehear
26
Roe and Doe after Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the bench.
Following reargument, the second draft of Roe emerged as the lead
opinion recognizing a right to abortion, implementing a suggestion made
27
by Justice Powell. This time, Justice Blackmun specified the temporal
21. GARROW, supra note 14, at 524.
22. Id. at 473–74, 532–33 (providing background on the appointment of Justice
Blackmun to replace Justice Abe Fortas and explaining how Justice Blackmun was assigned
the Roe and Doe opinions).
23. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, First Draft Opinion in Roe v. Wade 15 (May 18, 1972)
[hereinafter Roe First Draft] (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of
Congress, Box 151, Folder 4); Beck, supra note 10, at 517.
24. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, First Draft Opinion in Doe v. Bolton 9–11 (May 25,
1972) [hereinafter Doe First Draft] (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of
Congress, Box 152, Folder 7); Beck, supra note 10, at 517–18.
25. Beck, supra note 10, at 518.
26. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference, Re: No. 70-18—
Roe v. Wade, No. 70-40—Doe v. Bolton 1 (May 31, 1972) [hereinafter Blackmun
Memorandum to the Conference, May 31, 1972] (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers,
Library of Congress, Box 151, Folder 3); Beck, supra note 10, at 518.
27. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Second Draft Opinion in Roe v. Wade 37–49 (Nov. 22,
1972) [hereinafter Roe Second Draft] (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 151,
Folder 6); Beck, supra note 10, at 520 (noting the second draft’s consistency with Justice
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scope of the right, indicating that the state interest in protecting fetal life
28
becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester of pregnancy. He
explained this alteration in a cover memorandum accompanying the
draft:
In its present form [the opinion] contains dictum, but I suspect
that in this area some dictum is indicated and not to be avoided.
You will observe that I have concluded that the end of the
first trimester is critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other
selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally
29
arbitrary.
Less than three weeks later, again due to a suggestion from Justice
Powell, Justice Blackmun sought input from his colleagues as to whether
the Court should select the first trimester or viability as the controlling
line, a decision affecting “the interval from approximately 12 weeks to
30
about 28 weeks.” With only Justice Douglas expressing a preference to
retain the first-trimester cutoff, and some other Justices favoring a later
point in pregnancy, Justice Blackmun’s third draft of Roe shifted to the
31
viability rule found in the published opinion.
Nothing in Roe or Doe required the Court to address the duration of

Powell’s suggestion).
28. Roe Second Draft, supra note 27, at 47. Justice Blackmun wrote as follows:
We repeat that the State does have an important and legitimate interest in the
potentiality of human life and that this interest grows in strength as the woman
approaches term. At some point this interest becomes ‘compelling.’ We fix
that point at, or any time after, the end of the first trimester, as the State may
determine.
Id.
29. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference, Re: No. 70-18—
Roe v. Wade 1 (Nov. 21, 1972) [hereinafter Blackmun Memorandum to the Conference, Nov.
21, 1972] (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 151, Folder
6).
30. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference, Re: Abortion
Cases 1 (Dec. 11, 1972) [hereinafter Blackmun Memorandum to the Conference, Dec. 11,
1972] (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 151, Folder 4);
Beck, supra note 10, at 523.
31. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Third Draft Opinion in Roe v. Wade 48–49 (Dec. 21,
1972) (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 151, Folder 6);
Beck, supra note 10, at 524–25.
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abortion rights in order to strike down either the Texas or Georgia
statutes, a point made by a variety of individuals in internal Supreme
Court correspondence. Prior to circulation of the initial draft opinions,
for instance, Justice Brennan wrote privately to Justice Douglas:
I would deny any such [compelling State] interest in the life of
the fetus in the early stages of pregnancy. On the other hand, I
would leave open the question of when life ‘is actually present’—
whether there is some point in the term before birth at which the
32
interest in the life of the fetus does become subordinating.
The first draft of the Doe opinion pursued an approach similar to that
privately endorsed by Justice Brennan, stating, “Except to note that the
State’s interest grows stronger as the woman approaches term, we need
not delineate that interest with greater detail in order to recognize that
33
it is a ‘compelling’ state interest.”
After Justice Blackmun
incorporated a first-trimester cutoff in the second draft of Roe, one of
Justice Powell’s law clerks noted that “[s]ince the statutory prohibition
[in Texas] was total,” it was “unnecessary to the result that we draw the
34
line.” Justice Powell then made the same point to Justice Blackmun:
inquiring whether viability might serve as a better line than the first
trimester “if we conclude to designate a particular point of time,” he
acknowledged that “[o]f course, it is not essential that we express an
35
opinion as to such a date.”
Since it was unnecessary for the Court to address the duration of
abortion rights in Roe and Doe, Justices in the majority understood that
language on this issue appearing in the opinions would constitute
dictum. In his memorandum suggesting that the abortion cases be
reargued, Justice Blackmun asked whether the Court should go further

32. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Re: Abortion Cases 9 (Dec. 30,
1971) (on file with the William J. Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Box I:285, Folder 9);
Beck, supra note 10, at 516–17.
33. Doe First Draft, supra note 24, at 11. The referenced copy of this opinion from
Justice Blackmun’s files includes the word “perhaps” written by hand before the phrase
“grows stronger as the woman approaches term.” See id.
34. See David J. Garrow, Revelations on the Road to Roe, AM. LAW., May 2000, at 80,
82; Beck, supra note 10, at 521.
35. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice Harry Blackmun, Re: Abortion
Cases 1–2 (Nov. 29, 1972); Beck, supra note 10, at 522.
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than it had in the initial drafts: “Should we spell out—although it would
then necessarily be largely dictum—just what aspects are controllable by
36
the State and to what extent?”
As already noted, the cover
memorandum accompanying the second draft of Roe acknowledged the
inclusion of dictum in the opinion and then immediately called attention
37
to the adoption of a first-trimester cutoff point. A few weeks later,
Justice Stewart commented on this second draft:
One of my concerns with your opinion as presently written is the
specificity of its dictum—particularly in its fixing of the end of
the first trimester as the critical point for valid state action. I
appreciate the inevitability and indeed wisdom of dicta in the
Court’s opinion, but I wonder about the desirability of the dicta
38
being quite so inflexibly “legislative.”
Justice Stewart made explicit what had been implied in Justice
Blackmun’s cover memorandum, that the dicta incorporated in the
second draft of Roe included the language specifying the duration of
abortion rights.
A number of scholars have noted that the opinion in Roe literally
39
offered no justification for adopting the viability rule —an omission the
40
Court has yet to persuasively rectify. The Roe Court did venture a
conclusory reference to “logical and biological justifications” for state
regulation after viability, but made no effort to spell out those
41
justifications or show their significance for constitutional purposes.
36. Blackmun Memorandum to the Conference, May 31, 1972, supra note 26, at 2; Beck,
supra note 10, at 518.
37. See supra text accompanying note 29.
38. Memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart, Re: Abortion Cases (Dec. 14, 1972) (on
file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 151, Folder 8); Beck, supra
note 10, at 525.
39. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 18, at 267–70; Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 96 & n.171 (1995); John Hart Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 924 (1973); Nancy K.
Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639, 644, 664
(1986); Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life
and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1973).
40. Beck, supra note 18, at 267, 271–79 (demonstrating the lack of “principled
justification for the viability rule”).
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). John Hart Ely pinpointed the problem in his
classic response to the Roe opinion: “Exactly why [viability] is the magic moment is not made
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The Court’s internal deliberations on the duration of abortion rights
likewise seem sparse given the importance of the interests at stake.
After explaining his initial selection of the first-trimester cutoff, Justice
Blackmun offered some thoughts about viability as a possible line:
Viability, however, has its own strong points. It has logical and
biological justifications. There is a practical aspect, too, for I am
sure that there are many pregnant women, particularly younger
girls, who may refuse to face the fact of pregnancy and who, for
one reason or another, do not get around to medical consultation
until the end of the first trimester is upon them or, indeed, has
42
passed.
Justice Marshall echoed the latter point, expressing concern about
“the difficulties which many women may have in believing that they are
43
pregnant and in deciding to seek an abortion.” From the available
records, this argument that some women have difficulty facing the fact
of pregnancy appears to be the most explicit ground provided to the
44
Court for favoring the viability rule over the first trimester.
The
clear . . . . [T]he Court’s defense seems to mistake a definition for a syllogism.” Ely, supra
note 39, at 924.
42. Blackmun Memorandum to the Conference, Dec. 11, 1972, supra note 30, at 1; Beck,
supra note 10, at 523.
43. Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall, Re: Abortion Cases (Dec. 12, 1972)
(on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 151, Folder 4) (“Given
the difficulties which many women may have in believing that they are pregnant and in
deciding to seek an abortion, I fear that the earlier date may not in practice serve the interests
of those women, which your opinion does seek to serve.”). Justice Powell made a similar
point in a private memorandum to Justice Blackmun that apparently was never sent. See
Garrow, supra note 34, at 83 (“[T]he women who most need the benefit of liberalized
abortion laws are likely to be young, inexperienced, unsure, frightened and perhaps
unmarried.” (quoting Justice Powell)).
44. Justice Blackmun’s memorandum also contended that “few could argue, or would
argue, that a state’s interest by the time of viability, when independent life is presumably
possible, is not sufficiently developed to justify appropriate regulation.” See Blackmun
Memorandum to the Conference, Dec. 11, 1972, supra note 30, at 1. I have argued elsewhere
that the assertion the fetus is “independent” of the mother at viability fails to provide a
principled constitutional justification for the viability rule. See Beck, supra note 18, at 273–76.
Justice Powell’s private memorandum to Justice Blackmun inquiring about the possibility of
changing the controlling line from the first trimester to viability also quoted dicta from Judge
Newman’s opinion for the Second Circuit in Abele v. Markle to the effect that “the state
interest in protecting the life of a fetus capable of living outside the uterus could be shown to
be more generally accepted and, therefore, of more weight in the constitutional sense than
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argument did not make its way into the published opinion in Roe.
That some women remain unaware of pregnancy for a period of time
does not provide a principled constitutional justification for the viability
rule. Justices Blackmun and Marshall presumably feared that some
women would not learn of pregnancy until the end of the first trimester
or beyond, potentially depriving them of the opportunity to obtain an
45
abortion under a first-trimester cutoff. However, viability—the ability
of the fetus to survive outside the womb—has no logical connection to a
woman’s consciousness of pregnancy; many women are aware of
pregnancy long before fetal viability, and there may be unusual cases
where a woman with a viable fetus does not yet know she is pregnant.
Just as Roe’s public defense of the viability rule “seem[ed] to mistake a
46
definition for a syllogism,” the Court’s internal deliberations expose
the viability rule as an enormous non sequitur. Even if one believes the
right to abortion should extend beyond the first trimester in a case
where a woman remains unaware of pregnancy, this seems a remarkably
weak rationale for the Court’s decision to expand constitutional
abortion rights in all cases from “approximately 12 weeks” (the first
47
trimester) “to about 28 weeks” (viability). The fact that some women
have difficulty acknowledging a pregnancy provides no reason to deny
state regulatory power throughout the second trimester with respect to
those conscious of pregnancy from an early stage.
The Court’s failure to identify an adequate ground for the viability
rule, either in the opinion itself or in its internal deliberations, may be
attributable to the posture of the litigation. Since the duration of
abortion rights was not at issue in Roe or Doe, the parties did not brief
or argue the question, nor did they prepare a record designed to assist
the interest in preventing the abortion of a fetus that is not viable.” See Letter from Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Re: Abortion Cases, supra note 35, at 1 (quoting Abele v. Markle, 351
F. Supp. 224, 232 (D. Conn. 1972)). Justice Blackmun’s memorandum to the entire Court
seeking input on the durational issue did not include this argument, but it did reference Judge
Newman’s opinion. See Blackmun Memorandum to the Conference, Dec. 11, 1972, supra
note 30, at 2. On the idea of “general acceptance” as a justification for the viability rule, see
Randy Beck, The Essential Holding of Casey: Rethinking Viability, 75 UMKC L. REV. 713,
732–34 (2007); see also infra notes 61–64 and accompanying text (discussing polling data
showing that a supermajority of Americans believe second trimester abortions should be
presumptively illegal).
45. See Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall, supra note 43.
46. See Ely, supra note 39, at 924.
47. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

12-BECK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

744

3/20/2012 2:08 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[95:735
48

the Court in addressing the durational problem.
If the Court had
waited for a case in which the duration of abortion rights actually
affected the validity of a statute, the parties might have prepared a
record specifically addressing matters such as when most women learn
about pregnancy and what percentage remain unaware of their
49
condition after the first trimester. The briefs could have debated the
significance of such data for the validity of a particular statute, as well as
other relevant questions the Justices failed to consider. Instead, Justices
Blackmun and Marshall were reduced to speculation about essentially
empirical questions.
Justice Blackmun confessed in connection with Roe’s second draft
that he considered drawing the line at the first trimester “arbitrary,” but
that drawing it at quickening or viability would perhaps be “equally
50
arbitrary.” The Court’s unjustified decision to extend abortion rights
to the point of viability seems difficult to square with the description of
the Court’s role offered by the three-Justice plurality in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey: “Consistent with
other constitutional norms, legislatures may draw lines which appear
arbitrary without the necessity of offering a justification. But courts
51
may not. We must justify the lines we draw.” This account of proper
adjudication appears, ironically enough, as part of the Casey plurality’s
52
explanation for retaining Roe’s viability rule.
II.
We typically resolve political disagreements in this country through
democratic participation in electoral and legislative processes. Citizens
campaign and vote for candidates who represent their views and
elected representatives then negotiate political compromises. People
dissatisfied with those compromises may seek redress in later electoral
cycles or legislative sessions, but the process often reaches a point of
equilibrium when many of those pursuing a disputed question acquiesce
in the prevailing resolution, either because a better resolution seems
unattainable or because more pressing issues take precedence. When
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Beck, supra note 10, at 511–12, 528.
Id. at 528.
See Blackmun Memorandum to the Conference, Nov. 21, 1972, supra note 29.
505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
See id. at 869–70; Beck, supra note 18, at 271–72.
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courts read the Constitution to conclusively resolve a contested issue,
however, legislators lose the ability to negotiate a different resolution in
53
the lawmaking process.
Thus, when Roe extended constitutional
abortion rights through the second trimester of pregnancy, the Court
deprived legislators of the power to craft political compromises on the
central issues in the abortion controversy. Lawmakers could still act on
54
peripheral and less consequential matters, but the viability rule
withdrew the most important questions in the abortion conflict from the
55
legislative domain.
In adopting the viability rule, the Court made an enduring resolution
of the abortion conflict difficult to attain. The rule foreclosed the sorts
of political compromises that have found favor in the majority of the
world’s political systems. In at least two significant respects, Roe’s
viability rule offers less potential protection for fetal life than most of
56
the nations of the world.
First, the majority of nations limit the
57
grounds upon which an abortion can be obtained. Reasons vary from
country to country, with some very restrictive and others more
permissive, but a significant majority of nations regulate the permissible
58
grounds for an abortion. Roe, by contrast, has been understood to

53. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (“Congress may not
legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.”); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997). As Jeremy Waldron has argued, “[w]hen a
principle is entrenched in a constitutional document, the claim-right (to liberty or provision)
that it lays down is compounded with an immunity against legislative change.” Jeremy
Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 27
(1993). The result of according the right constitutional status, therefore, is “a disabling of the
legislature from its normal functions of revision, reform and innovation in the law.” Id.
54. See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding
parental notification requirement prior to minor’s abortion, subject to judicial bypass); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding denial of funding for abortions); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (permitting proscription of abortion “subsequent to viability”
with exceptions for the mother’s life and health).
55. The Court indicated a few years ago that approximately 1.3 million abortions are
performed annually in this country, with 85%–90% taking place in the first trimester and
most of the remainder performed in the second trimester. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
134–35 (2007).
56. See Beck, supra note 18, at 261–65.
57. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, THE WORLD’S ABORTION LAWS 1–2
(2009), available at http://fidakenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Worlds-Abortion-Laws2009.pdf; Beck, supra note 18, at 263–64.
58. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 57, at 1–2; Beck, supra note 18, at
264.
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forbid such regulations prior to viability. Second, nations that permit
abortion without restriction as to the reason generally limit the exercise
of abortion rights to a much shorter time period than Roe, usually
59
twelve weeks or less. Only a small handful of countries recognize an
60
unrestricted right to abortion to the point of viability or beyond.
Not only has the viability rule barred political compromises accepted
in most other countries, but, more importantly, it has guaranteed a
regime of abortion rights substantially out of alignment with public
sentiment in this country. In recent polling by the Gallup organization,
respondents were asked whether “abortion should generally be legal or
61
generally illegal during each of the following stages of pregnancy.”
When asked about the “[f]irst three months” of pregnancy, a sizable
62% to 35% majority expressed the opinion that abortion should be
62
legal. The numbers reversed, however, when asked about the second
trimester. Respondents answered by an even larger 71% to 24%
majority that abortion should generally be illegal during the “[s]econd
63
three months” of pregnancy. These numbers, consistent with prior
polling on the issue, indicate that approximately seven out of ten
Americans believe the second-trimester abortions shielded by Roe’s
64
viability rule should be presumptively illegal. It is not just committed
59. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 57, at 1–2; Beck, supra note 18, at
264.
60. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 57, at 1–2; Beck, supra note 18, at
264.
61. Lydia Saad, Common State Abortion Restrictions Spark Mixed Reviews, GALLUP
(July 25, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148631/common-state-abortion-restrictions-sparkmixed-reviews.aspx.
62. Id. Three percent of respondents selected “it depends” and one percent offered “no
opinion.” Id.
63. Id. (3% selected “it depends” and 2% offered “no opinion”). During the “[l]ast
three months” of pregnancy, 10% of respondents thought abortion should generally be legal
and 86% thought it generally should be illegal. Id.
64. The chart below shows representative (percentage) results from various Gallup polls
on the issue of whether second trimester abortions should be legal or illegal:

Apr. 2000
Jan. 2003
Jan. 2006
July 2011

Legal
24
25
25
24

Illegal
69
68
68
71

Depends
4
4
3

No opinion
3
3
7
2
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pro-lifers who take that position. The data suggests that a third or more
of the public supports abortion rights in the first trimester, but wants to
see significant legal restrictions in the second trimester, restrictions
65
declared out of bounds under Roe’s viability rule.
By protecting abortions that many Americans find distressing, the
66
viability rule has fostered pro-life mobilization. In the debate over
“partial-birth abortions,” a significant popular majority responded to
vivid descriptions of the “dilation and extraction” (D&X) or “intact
dilation and evacuation” (intact D&E) method used in a small
67
percentage of second- and third-trimester abortions. In opposing a
federal ban on the procedure, the dissenting Justices in Gonzales v.
Carhart argued that the much more common “D&E by
68
dismemberment” —employed in most second-trimester abortions—is
“equally gruesome,” making it irrational to forbid one procedure and
69
When even those who most strongly support
not the other.
constitutional protection for second-trimester abortions acknowledge
70
that the prevailing method can be characterized as “brutal,” it does not
See Saad, Common State Abortion Restrictions Spark Mixed Reviews, supra note 61; Lydia
Saad, Abortion Views Reviewed as Alito Vote Nears, GALLUP (Jan. 20, 2006),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/20983/abortion-views-reviewed-alito-vote-nears.aspx; Lydia Saad,
Americans Agree with Banning “Partial-Birth Abortion,” GALLUP (Nov. 6, 2003),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/9658/americans-agree-banning-partialbirth-abortion.aspx; Lydia
Saad, Americans Walk the Middle Road on Abortion, GALLUP (Apr. 10, 2000),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/3016/americans-walk-middle-road-abortion.aspx.
65. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973).
66. See Ann MacLean Massie, So-Called “Partial-Birth Abortion” Bans: Bad Medicine?
Maybe. Bad Law? Definitely!, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 301, 378–79 (1998) (claiming opponents of
D&X abortions rely on “the shock value of the physical description of the procedure . . . in
garnering support for their position”).
67. The July 2011 Gallup poll found a 64%–31% split in favor of a law “which would
make it illegal to perform a specific abortion procedure conducted in the last six months of
pregnancy known as a ‘partial birth abortion,’ except in cases necessary to save the life of the
mother.” See Saad, Common State Abortion Restrictions Spark Mixed Reviews, supra note 61;
see also Saad, Americans Agree with Banning “Partial-Birth Abortion,” supra note 64.
68. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 178 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (using term
“D&E by dismemberment” to refer to standard D&E procedure).
69. Id. at 182 (“[T]he notion that either of these two equally gruesome procedures . . . is
more akin to infanticide than the other, or that the State furthers any legitimate interest by
banning one but not the other, is simply irrational.” (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S.
914, 946–47 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
70. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Nonintact D&E could equally
be characterized as ‘brutal,’ . . . involving as it does ‘tear[ing] [a fetus] apart’ and ‘ripp[ing] off’
its limbs.” (quoting majority opinion)).
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seem surprising that the pro-life movement has persuaded many citizens
to make abortion a voting issue. Roe’s supporters have also been forced
to defend difficult ground in connection with the reasons for
terminating a pregnancy. Under the traditional reading of the viability
71
rule, parents who want a male child, rather than a female, or who do
72
not want a child with a cleft palate, have just as much right to a previability abortion as a woman whose life is endangered by a pregnancy.
Greenhouse and Siegel doubt that Roe can be accused of shutting
73
down politics with respect to abortion. Certainly, Roe did not prevent
people passionate about abortion from engaging in political activity
based on their convictions. But Roe’s viability rule did disable
legislators from negotiating a middle ground on the issue, barring the
compromises that have been worked out in other countries. It
entrenched the second-trimester abortions that a supermajority of
Americans believe should be presumptively illegal, and channeled
abortion-related political activity into national venues.
Even for a Court committed to a constitutional right to abortion,
things need not have turned out the way they did. Imagine that instead
of embracing the viability rule, the Supreme Court’s initial opinion
recognizing a right to abortion had looked more like the first draft of
Doe (a right of unspecified duration) or even the second draft of Roe (a
74
right during the first trimester). No doubt there always would have
been some people (this author included) who thought the Court’s
decision inconsistent with a fair reading of the text of the Due Process
71. See William Saletan, Fetal Subtraction: Sex Selection in the United States, SLATE
(Apr. 3, 2008), http://www.slate.com/id/2188114/ (discussing statistical evidence that sexselection abortions occur in the United States).
72. Health service officials in the United Kingdom were recently forced to disclose
information on late term abortions. The data revealed that, in 2010, seven abortions were
carried out in England and Wales before twenty-four weeks because of cleft lip and palate.
Court Ruling Prompts Late Abortion Data Release, BBC (July 4, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-14015096; see also Simon Caldwell, Baby that Survived
Botched Abortion Was Rejected for Cleft Lip and Palate, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/7652889/Baby-thatsurvived-botched-abortion-was-rejected-for-cleft-lip-and-palate.html.
73. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2032 (“The backlash narrative conventionally
identifies the Supreme Court’s decision as the cause of polarizing conflict and imagines
backlash as arising in response to the Court repressing politics . . . . [However,] the history
that we examine shows how conflict over abortion escalated through the interaction of other
institutions before the Court ruled.”).
74. See Doe First Draft, supra note 24, at 9–11; Roe Second Draft, supra note 27, at 47.
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Clause. But the political aftermath of the opinion would likely have
played out very differently. Political conflict over abortion would have
been fragmented into smaller, more localized clashes.
Greater
legislative flexibility to address the abortion conflict might have
prompted the emergence of a diversity of positions on the issue and
would have permitted state-specific compromises acceptable to a
majority of state citizens (subject to some constitutional minimum
75
enforced by the courts). Instead, the Supreme Court unwisely and
unnecessarily locked in place the existing constitutional protection for
most second-trimester abortions, a rule out of step with public sentiment
and inconsistent with international standards. The result has been a
long-running conflict over the future of the Court with major
consequences for electoral politics.
III.
One can critique Roe based on its consequences for our political life
without drawing the lesson Greenhouse and Siegel fear from the
backlash narrative, “that adjudication inevitably causes political conflict
76
and polarization and is thus to be avoided at all cost.” The experience
with Roe could instead teach a lesson about the virtue of judicial
77
minimalism.
Unnecessary and expansive dictum, issued without
briefing or argument, without a record prepared for the purpose, and
without adequate explanation, may generate unforeseen consequences
harmful to our political system. How different our constitutional and
75. Greenhouse and Siegel argue that pro-life activists would not have been satisfied
with a more circumscribed right to abortion:
The fervent minority who entered politics to work against abortion rights
before and after Roe sought criminalization and were not willing to settle for
less. To those who believe that abortion is murder, there is no middle ground;
it makes no difference whether a judicial or legislative decision permits
abortion up to twelve weeks’ gestation or twenty.
Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2074 n.163. But controversial issues can reach
relatively stable political resolutions even if a significant minority of the population finds the
outcome unsatisfactory. A less ambitious Roe opinion would have permitted legislative
compromises that could gain majority support among citizens, even if activists on both sides
objected.
76. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2086.
77. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT, at ix (1999) (“A minimalist court settles the case before it, but leaves many
things undecided.”).
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political history might have been if Justice Blackmun had been satisfied
with a minimalist resolution of Roe and Doe, rather than aspiring to
“spell out” in the Court’s first substantive opinions on abortion rights
78
“just what aspects are controllable by the State and to what extent.”

78. See supra text accompanying note 36.

